Reds With Rockets: Difference between revisions

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* [http://world.guns.ru/grenade/gl02-e.htm RPG-7] - RPG does not stand for Rocket Propelled Grenade, which was a [[wikipedia:Backronym|backronym]]; RPG stands for ''Ruchnoy Protivotankoviy Granatomyot'', "hand-held anti-tank grenade-launcher", so "RPG Launcher" is an incorrect usage. Much loved by terrorists both real and fictional. The version that [[IKEA Weaponry|breaks down into two pieces]] is the paratrooper model.
* Strela-2 ("arrow")/SA-7 "Grail"- the first Soviet man-portable SAM. Terrorists like the thing. Wasn't very powerful (it got better in the Strela-2M/SA-7B version) and loved the Sun too much.
* Igla ("needle")/SA-18 "Grouse"- a modern hand-held SAM exported to a number of countries (including [[Indians With Iglas|India]]) and also used by terrorist groups.
 
 
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In [[World War II]] and the [[Cold War]], the cornerstone of the Soviet design for the offensive was the concept of deep battle and deep operations. Tactical forward and raiding detachments and subsequently operational maneuver groups would be inserted into the enemy's rear at the earliest possible moment. These were to undermine fatally the stability of the defense by seizing depth defense lines before they could be occupied by the enemy, by combating enemy reserves in meeting battles, by destroying the command structure and logistic support on which the front line formations depended to halt the attacker's main forces, and by encircling the enemy's defending groupings. In this way the enemy would be defeated more or less simultaneously in front and rear, and his defense would be collapsed and destroyed rather than merely pushed back to fight again once reinforced from the depth or passive sectors.
 
By the 1980s, the cornerstone of the Soviet offensive became the ''theater-strategic operation'', which was a framework for achieving strategic military objectives by armed forces in a continental theater of military operations, in the initial period of war (30 days) and without the use of nuclear weapons.
 
Some words must be said about Soviet nuclear strategy and escalation: Contrary to popular belief, the Soviets would ''never'' initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a war. In the context of a conventional war, the Soviets would use nuclear weapons if NATO decided on their ''mass'' use first, or if the Soviet homeland was being threatened with a strategic offensive. The Soviets never planned on nuking to "recharge" a bogged-down offensive. The Soviet leadership claimed that NATO use of any nuclear weapon would be responded with all-out nuclear war, but the General Staff considered the possibility of proportionate responses to a limited U.S. attack, although they "doubted that nuclear war could remain limited for long."
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{{reflist}}
[[Category:Forces With Firepower]]
[[Category:Useful Notes]]
[[Category:Dirty Communists]]
[[Category:Useful Notes/Russia]]