Russians With Rusting Rockets: Difference between revisions

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The red star was planned to be dropped from their aircraft, with a new symbol being designed... only for it to look almost completely like the old one (the only difference being one narrow blue band around the star to match the colors of the flag) due to strong opposition against a radical change.
 
'''[[The Simpsons (animation)|The whole world will know the name Field Marshal Simon Stoolowitz!]] - The So-Called Reforms'''
 
The latest (to date - 2011) chapter of Russian military history is the much-maligned reform conducted by the defense minister Serdyukov. Russia's first civilian minister of defense (not counting Leo Trotsky) is widely considered absolutely incompetent in his job; servicemen rewarded him with the unflattering nickname "Field Marshal Taburetkin" (from ''taburet'' - stool), since his previous job was manager of a furniture mall. Some of his reforms are based on quite sound ideas; it's the practice that earned him the [[Hatedom]].
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On the other hand, much of his reform (which is not actually his, but a concerted governmental effort) is, as noted above, based on the solid reasoning, however bad its execution went, and the whole affair is a controversial thing, which [[Base Breaker|breaks the base]] among both the serving soldiers and [[Armchair Military|civilian military buffs]] like there's no tomorrow. The reform proponents claim that a lot of what is perceived as dumb moves is actually a sort of bitter medicine that was sorely needed, but no one has the heart and means to do. Whether that's really so is mostly the matter of personal opinion.
 
For example, the old Soviet doctrine envisioned a massed land war not unlike the [[World War II]], which, frankly, [[Blatant Lies|isn't likely nowadays at all]]-- cue—cue the establishment of joint regional commands and a shift to the brigade structure as a way to improve coordination and control. After all, the Russian military was for the most part still structured around WWII expectations, just as the Soviet one was.
 
It assumed a mass mobilization of the conscripts in the time of war, and thus in peacetime its rank structure was ''incredibly'' top heavy -- inheavy—in Russian Army captains did the stuff for which [[Sergeant Rock|professional master sergeants]] would suffice, because NCOs were mostly conscripts and would leave after a year or two, leaving a hole in the ranks, while officers were career soldiers and were expected to stay. Thus, claim the reform proponents, with the creation of the professional NCO corps a lot of officer positions simply become obsolete, leading to the mass discharges -- whichdischarges—which, understandably, angered the people discharged.
 
The catch is, as of now there's still not that many professional NCOs around, and, anyway, the military has a huge problem with the ''quality'' of its volunteers: it's mainly poor, badly educated, working class young men with not much to do outside of the army, so their motivation and discipline leaves much to be desired. There are attempts to take some measures about it, such as almost twofold increase in pay (which actually comes across the board for the whole MoD) and much more stringent requirements and intensive training, but they are yet to bear fruit, if that's at all possible.
 
Another reason for resistance is plain graft (or, better put, the competition for graft opportunities). During the turmoil of the [[The New Russia|Nineties]], a lot of the officers, especially senior ones, became corrupt and struck a lot of lucrative deals with the local businesses and even criminal gangs. So, for these officers a chance of losing the ability to skim off the top -- eithertop—either because of cleaning of the house, as reform's proponents say, or because the Serdyukov's cronies want to steal themselves, by the words of its detractors -- isdetractors—is understandably an anathema either way. And then there's a simple resistance to change. A lot of much needed reforms are refused on the ground level simply for the [[Sarcasm Mode|entirely justified reason]] of "That's not our way, [[Misplaced Nationalism|that's how Americans do it]]".
 
Equipment squabbles that much intensified during the Serdyukov's tenure, are a bit more complex story, but the core of the problem is rather simple: during the Nineties [[Why We're Bummed Communism Fell|most of the Soviet military industry simply died]], or at least come to the verge of death, because the nation just didn't have the money for the new toys for its military. Very few companies (Sukhoi, for example, and that's why its CEO, Mikhail Pogosyan, now leads the United Aircraft Corporation) managed to stay afloat, mainly on export contracts, and any technological progress not linked to them simply stalled.
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Things are also pretty bright on the Air Force front, with the new 4++ gen fighters like Su-35 and MiG-35, a major upgrades of the Su-27 and MiG-29 families entering serial production, and a new [[Super Prototype|5-gen fighter prototype]], a Sukhoi's T-50, undergoing testing. The humongous An-124 transport is getting on the assembly line again, funded in part by the US military's inexhaustible airlift needs, and new Yak-130 advanced trainer helps young pilots to learn the ropes. Even the new bomber platform is deliberated, with [[Mnogo Nukes Bombers|some truly unbelievable rumors]] coming down the grapevine. And helicopters are being baked by the dozen, both utility and gunships as well, including the navalized Ka-52 Sea Alligator for ''Mistrals''.
 
Land forces are also getting an overhaul, and receiving some new toys. The 2008 South Ossetia war showed the weakness the Russian Army has in C&C, with officers sometimes having to switch to civilian mobiles to direct the troops. Thus the whole slew of new communication and reconnaissance equipment, including UAVs, are being designed, tested, and adopted -- sometimesadopted—sometimes with the mixed results. Then there's the infamous uniforms debacle, which is often used to showcase the reform's shortcomings.
 
You see, the MoD decided to introduce a new, modern synthetic uniform, rather closely modeled after the American ACU, with a new digital camo pattern (unofficially dubbed ''Tsifra'', "Digit"), which theoretically was much better than the old natural fabric (mostly wool and cotton, with some sheep furs) one, but in fact the quality was a hit-and-miss, and, in a stellar example of [[Poor Communication Kills]], the upper echelons failed to adequately inform and train the line officers, who in Russia decide the details of the wearing, such as issuing the hats and warmer coats in a cold weather, that it has the completely different wearing directions than the old one.
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This has lead to several high profile cases of the soldiers contracting pneumonia (with some deaths) due to improperly issued uniforms, which cemented the ill reputation of ''Yudashkin's uniform'' (after a famous fashion designer, even though he wasn't really involved in its design<ref>He designed a ceremonial parade uniform of the Presidential Regiment's Honor Guard and most other dress uniforms</ref>) in the minds of many. Now there's a second iteration in the works, now basically a carbon copy of the ACU in cut and structure, that's being tested and deployed, with much more intensive training on its wearing.
 
Another matter of note is the armor. A several major development programs were initiated to create three unified platforms for most armored vehicles: heavy, up to 60 tons, tracked -- thistracked—this will become [[Tank Goodness|new tanks]], SPGs, etc, it was dubbed "Armata"; medium tracked one, up to 25 tons, mainly for the future [[Awesome Personnel Carrier|IFVs]], designated "Kurganets-25"; and two wheeled ones, medium, for the future APC, and light, as a mine-protected Humvee counterpart -- currentcounterpart—current armored light truck, GAZ Tigr, has pretty limited mine resistance.
 
For the meantime, the military decided to bid its time, refusing to buy new tanks and haggling incessantly with the industry. The plants (whose [[Corrupt Corporate Executive|managers]] often tend to pad their prices) threaten the unrest of their unemployed workers, while the military threatens to buy abroad, and sometimes does, as it was with the Italian "Lynx" armored truck and "Centauro" wheeled tank destroyer, or a bung of Israeli UAVs.
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[[Category:Forces With Firepower]]
[[Category:Useful Notes/Russia]]
[[Category:{{PAGENAME}}Russians With Rusting Rockets]]
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