The Wages of Destruction: Difference between revisions

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* [[All There in the Manual]]: Both ''[[Mein Kampf]]'' and the "Second Book" (the follow-up to Mein Kampf) are extensively referenced for Hitler's specific economics related statements.
* [[Attack Its Weak Point]]: The Ruhr valley was a massive one for the Germans. Despite attempts to mitigate the damage, as Allied bombers kept hitting the Ruhr, it crippled manh=y resources critical to all of the German war industry and a even civilian needs by a considerable margin.
* [[Bad Boss]]: '''Hitler'''. He was prone to making demands on industry for quotas that at times [[Holy Shit Quotient|''exceeded the global capacity of the entire world'']] and would not take no for an answer. Those who insisted on saying no risked everything from their careers to their personal safety, especially in the latter years of the Nazi regime.
* [[Bait and Switch]]: As Tooze explains, a common myth was the Nazis wanting to sponsor job creation programs for workers. The reality was that such had been considered and discredited under the Weimar regime as well as the Nazis, and when they finally were enacted, their true purpose was to jump start industry of military value, though sold to outside observers as an attempt to employ more labor that was unemployed.
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** Carl Goerdeler, who had been commissioned to evaluate the currency situation of Germany circa 1936 in regards to international markets, rather bravely wrote an honest report effectively pointing out the dangers of continued Nazi-led subsidy that dumped exports on the world market and even advocated reaching a modus vivendi on many issues the Nazis would have consider verboten, such as military rebuilding and anti-Semitic policies. Given he would become part of the later resistance that tried to kill Hitler in 1944, this was an early bold step that put him in grave danger even then.
** Schwerin von Krosigk and Ludwig Beck had a brief moment of success in their roles as Reich Finance Minister and Chief of Staff. In 1938, Germany was simply not ready for a war and both men knew it, and while Hitler only backed down reluctantly at the last minute, both manage to stall for enough time to get him to reconsider for military and economic reasons. By the next year neither was in a position to do the same again, [[Foregone Conclusion|and Hitler was not taking no for an answer then]].
* Hans Kehrl of the Armaments Ministry might have been a diehard Nazi, but even he realized Germany was screwed and tried to convince Albert Speer as much in 1943, only to have his pleas fall on deaf ears. As for Speer himself, it was more ambiguous. He was willing to admit things were bad post 1943, but ws also the lone optimist keeping Hitler's wishes going despite all pessimism otherwise from anyone else.
* [[Paper Tiger]]: In many ways, the Nazis had economic issues so vast they were downright laughable, which they only partially were able to conceal at best, but this concealment failed almost completely post-1943, revealing their economy to be even more pathetic than towards the end of WWI.
* [[Plausible Deniability]]: [[Discussed]] and ultimately mocked. While even back to the Weimar Republic Germany always wanted to rearm in direct defiance of the Versailles Treaty, the economic side was initially well hidden and the scale of the plans were fairly modest to invoke this trope. By the time of [[Nazi Germany]], they quit trying to even pretend this trope was in effect and by 1934 an imbecile could tell exactly what they were doing, pathetically weak denials to the contrary.