Chernobyl Disaster: Difference between revisions

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This test is important enough that Deputy-Chief engineer Anatoly Dyatlov chooses to supervise it personally. Dyatlov was not well liked - by all accounts he was an abrasive man and very strict about professionalism. He had friends outside work - those who had come with him from his previous posting - but not many.

He was a man who ~~didcated~~ himself to his work by day - and at night indulged in Soviet culture and art. He was the son of a Siberian river lamplighter, who now lit the lamps across all of Ukraine. He was feared for his harsh treatment of his subordinates - regularly dressing-down those who found themselves beneath his gaze.. He was respected for his knowledge and experience - knowing every micrometre of the reactor and every corner of its workings.

He was a man who dedicated himself to his work by day - and at night indulged in Soviet culture and art. He was the son of a Siberian river lamplighter, who now lit the lamps across all of Ukraine. He was feared for his harsh treatment of his subordinates - regularly dressing-down those who found themselves beneath his gaze.. He was respected for his knowledge and experience - knowing every micrometre of the reactor and every corner of its workings.

Even he found somthing deeply unknowable about the core of Reactor 4.

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Or more simply, the accident was inevitable.

"The Operating Procedures permitted operating conditions similar to those prevailing at Chernobyl Unit 4 on 26 April 1986 and they might have occurred without any intervention on the part of the personnel. We only need to assume a perfectly possible situation in which triggering of EPS-3 occurswhen the reactor is operating initially at rated power with an ORM of26 manual control rods. Under these conditions, approximately one hour after triggering of EPS-3 the ORM could have fallen to less than 15 manual control rods at a reactor power of 200-300 MW(th), and any further action, whether automatic or remote, to shut down the reactor could have led to a similar repetition of the events of 26 April 1986." - [[ https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf| INSAG 7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1]]

"The Operating Procedures permitted operating conditions similar to those prevailing at Chernobyl Unit 4 on 26 April 1986 and they might have occurred without any intervention on the part of the personnel. We only need to assume a perfectly possible situation in which triggering of EPS-3 occurswhen the reactor is operating initially at rated power with an ORM of26 manual control rods. Under these conditions, approximately one hour after triggering of EPS-3 the ORM could have fallen to less than 15 manual control rods at a reactor power of 200-300 MW(th), and any further action, whether automatic or remote, to shut down the reactor could have led to a similar repetition of the events of 26 April 1986." - [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_web.pdf INSAG 7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1]

No violation of procedures was required. The conditions that caused the explosion had the potential to occur automatically in the normal operation of the reactor.

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Anatoly Sitnikov receives 1500 rads - certain death two times over. He will die on the 30th of May. For the entire time that he can speak, he refuses to blame anyone for what happened.

[[ https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208405 | Sometime after mid-day Bryukhanov reports to Moscow 1000uR/sec as the maximum radiation dose in the vicinity of the plant.]]

[https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208405 Sometime after mid-day Bryukhanov reports to Moscow 1000uR/sec as the maximum radiation dose in the vicinity of the plant.]

The reactor continues to burn.