Preparing for the Last War: Difference between revisions
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***Also every specialty with the guild-feuding that marked [[World War 2]] had their own idea of what preparing for the next war would be. Even if they did intend to do such preparations. This could sometimes lead to unfortunate things like all the most glamorous specialties draining the infantry which no one wanted to get into for [[Cannon Fodder|obvious reasons.]]
***The American carrier fleet was foisted on the Navy almost by accident. After the Washington Naval Treaty limited the number of ''battleships'' someone got the bright idea of [[Fridge Logic|"We don't want to lose this nice juicy budget we're getting from Congress and besides our Admirals need somewhere to park all their brassy ostentation.]] So even though the American brass really preferred battleships, as it happened they decided, "Well carriers will be kinda nice even if they aren't battleships." The Japanese Navy whose [[Glory Days]] were the [[Russo-Japanese War]] built the gigantic but as it turned out, useless battleships ''Yamato'' and ''Musashi'' as well as their carrier fleet. More practically they invested in advanced torpedoes and specialized training for lookouts.
***In [[World War 2]] the German army was ideally prepared-for the [[Franco-Prussian War]]. That is is could overcome almost enemy tactically for one or two campaigns. Assuming they had a terrain with docile civilians and well-tended roads. And assuming that their enemy accepted them as being [[Worthy Opponent|equally civilized]] and worth making peace with. In [[World War 2]] they found enemies who thought them a threat to their existence in environments completely hostile and were forced to stretch their resources unbearably. The German ''tactical'' system worked well enough until it broke down from attrition. It's fault was in strategy which was really the fault of policymakers. On the other hand the German army power centers had often supported Hitler temporarily (to get better budgets), and so kind of got what they at least (if not all of their soldiers) had coming.
** …except those who paid attention to [[Red October]] and wars in which the Soviet Union was entangled, including the [[Spanish Civil War]]: most high-ranked Red Army commanders participated in both last big wars, obviously considered ''their'' last and victorious big war, "the way to do it right", and hopelessly mired WWI abhorrent — and taught others this way.<!--No idea what this last bit was meant to say, can someone clarify?--> Which in turn led to promoting [[Attack! Attack! Attack!|a very aggressive style]] that worked in highly mobile warfare, but was ill-prepared for adequate defence whenever "good offence" was not the best response.
**Old-school eighteenth century officers in the [[Napoleonic Wars]] were not so much unprepared tactically (in fact they often thought themselves quite the forward thinkers). However there was a limit to how far their tactical speculation could go and it was limited to what a monarchist state or a Constitutional Monarchy (like Britain) or the few Medieval-style republics could manage. This usually meant a permanent army of [[Army of Thieves and Whores|otherwise unemployable soldiers]] commanded by [[Officer and a Gentleman|traditionalists]] fighting temporary wars over territory. What it did not mean was the options that could be brought in by conscription. The new ideas included permanent corps and divisions (self-contained multi-armed sub-armies). As well as greater reliance on skirmishing tactics (which long existed but was not as emphasized). And greater trust in subordinate commanders. A lot of these things were speculated on for decades in clubs and military periodicals. But it took a Revolution in France to bring a government that would dare demand enough of its people to use these techniques.
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